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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Brett J. Jacobson appeals from the district court's order reversing the
magistrate court's dismissal of misdemeanor charges of driving under the
influence, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
After a traffic stop, Jacobson was arrested for misdemeanor driving under
the influence, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.7-11.) On June 28, 2010, Jacobson was arraigned and
pleaded not guilty to all three charges. (R., pp.14-16.) He was released on his
own recognizance the same day with standard release conditions. (R., p.17.)
Jacobson's counsel entered a notice of appearance, speedy trial demand,
and demand for sworn complaint on July 9, 2010. (R., pp.18-20.) The state filed
a sworn criminal complaint on August 2, 2010. (R., pp.32-34.) Responding to
the complaint, Jacobson entered a second notice of appearance, not guilty plea,
and speedy trial demand on August 13, 2010.

(R., pp.49-51.) Jacobson also

filed a motion to suppress evidence from the traffic stop.

(R., pp.52-81.)

On

September 24, 2010, while the suppression motion was pending, the magistrate
court scheduled a jury trial for January 14, 2011 - six months and 17 days after
Jacobson first pleaded not guilty to the charges. (R., p.84.) On October 4,2010,
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after a hearing, the magistrate court denied Jacobson's motion to suppress. (R.,
p.89.)
On January 4, 2011, six months and seven days after he first pleaded not
guilty to the charges, and 10 days before the scheduled jury trial, Jacobson filed
a motion to dismiss, contending that his speedy trial rights under the United
States and Idaho Constitutions, and I.C. § 19-3501 (4), had been violated. (R.,
pp.90-110.) The magistrate court granted the motion and dismissed the charges.
(R., pp.111-112.)

The state appealed the dismissal to the district court.

(R.,

pp.113-115.) In its intermediate appellate capacity, the district court concluded
that Jacobson's speedy trial rights had not been violated, and reversed the
magistrate court's dismissal of the charges. (R., pp.181-194.)
Jacobson timely appealed.

(R., pp.197-203); see I.A.R. 11 (c)(1 0). The

magistrate court stayed the criminal case pending the outcome of the appeal.
(R., p.211.)
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ISSUE
states the issue on appeal as:
Did Judge Watkins commit legal error in his application of I.C. § 19-3501
to the facts of this case?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Jacobson failed to show that the district court erred in reversing the
magistrate court's dismissal order and reinstating the criminal charges?
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ARGUMENT
Jacobson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Reversing The
Magistrate Court's Dismissal Order And Reinstating The Criminal Charges

A.

Introduction
Jacobson contends that the district court erred in reversing the magistrate

court's dismissal of the charges against him. (See generally Appellant's brief.)
Specifically, Jacobson contends that the district court erred in concluding that his
statutory speedy trial rights were not violated. (.!sl) However, the record reveals
that the district court considered the proper factors in evaluating Jacobson's
speedy trial claim, and correctly reversed the magistrate court and reinstated the
criminal charges.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). If the
district court properly applied the law to the facts the appellate court will affirm
the district court's order. See id. (citing Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758;
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981 )).
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's statutory right to a
speedy trial presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho
255,257, 16 P.3d 931, 933 (2000). The appellate court defers to the trial court's
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findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, but
freely reviews the trial court's application of the law to the facts found.

C.

kt

The District Court Correctly Concluded That Jacobson's Speedy Trial
Rights Were Not Violated
"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1,

§ 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a
speedy triaL" State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349,352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App.
2007).

When analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and

federal constitutions, the Idaho appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing test
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972). State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001); Lopez,
144 Idaho at 352,160 P.3d at 1288; State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849,853,153 P.3d
1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). The factors to be considered are: (1) the length of
the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his or her
right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. Barker,
407 U.S. at 530.
Idaho Code § 19-3501 supplements the speedy trial provisions of the
United States and Idaho Constitutions and sets forth specific time limits within
which a criminal defendant must be brought to trial. Clark, 135 Idaho at 257, 16
P.3d at 933. Specifically, I.C. § 19-3501 (4), the portion of the statute relevant to
this case, provides:
The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must
order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the following
cases:
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(4) If a defendant, charged with a misdemeanor
offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his
application, is not brought to trial within six (6) months
from the date that the defendant enters a plea of not
guilty with the court.
For purposes of this statute, "good cause means that there is a sUbstantial
reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay." Clark, 135 Idaho at
260, 16 P.3d at 936 (citing State v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 56, 58, 803 P.2d 557,
559 (Ct. App. 1990); State v. Stuart, 113 Idaho 494, 496, 745 P.2d 1115, 1117
(Ct. App. 1987)); accord State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 116, 29 P.3d 949, 952
(2001 ).
In Clark, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that whether a "good
cause" determination under I.C. § 19-3501 contemplates an analysis of the
constitutional speedy trial factors enunciated in Barker "has been a point of
contention in this Court for a number of years." Clark, 135 Idaho at 258, 803
P.2d at 934. The Court clarified that a good cause determination under I.C. § 193501 may take into account the factors listed in Barker to the extent that they

bear on the sufficiency of the good cause itself. Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 803
P.2d at 936 (citing State v. Peterson, 288 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Iowa 1980)). Thus,
to the extent the Barker factors bear on, or are relevant to, the sufficiency of the
cause for a trial delay, a court may still conduct an appropriate balancing test
utilizing those factors.

For example, to the extent a trial delay is short, or a

defendant cannot show prejudice from a delay, or if the defendant has not
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asserted his right to a speedy trial, a weaker reason will constitute "good cause."
Clark, 135 Idaho at 260,803 P.2d

936 (quoting Peterson, 288 N.W.2d at 335).

Since Clark, the idaho Court of Appeals has utilized each of the Barker
factors in making "good cause" determinations pursuant to I.C. § 19-3501. See
~

State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8, 10-11,27 P.3d 417,419-320 (Ct. App.

2001); State v. Livas, 147 Idaho 547, 549-550, 211 P.3d 792, 794-795 (Ct. App.
2009); State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 899-903, 231 P.3d 532, 544-548 (Ct. App.
2010).
Thus, there is no fixed rule for determining whether good cause exists to
delay a trial and, as such, the matter is initially left to the discretion of the trial
court. Young, 136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952 (citing Clark, 135 Idaho at 260,
16 P.3d at 936). Ultimately, "whether legal excuse has been shown is a matter
for judicial determination upon the facts and circumstances of each case." Clark,
135 Idaho at 260,16 P.3d at 936 (citing Johnson, 119 Idaho at 58,803 P.2d at
559; Stuart, 113 Idaho at 496,745 P.2d at 1117). The trial court's discretion is
not unbridled, however, and its decision is subject to independent review on
appeal. Young, 136 Idaho at 116, 29 P.3d at 952 (citing Clark, 135 Idaho at 260,
16 P.3d at 936).
In this case, it is undisputed that the jury trial was set for January 14,
2011, due to a magistrate court ISTARS data entry error. (Appellant's brief, pp.24; R., pp.183, 219.) The ISTARS system generates a speedy trial-compliant jury
trial date based on the date of a defendant's not guilty plea. (R., pp.183, 219.)
However, in this instance, instead of entering the date of Jacobson's June 28,
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2010 initial not-guilty plea, the magistrate court entered dates associated with the
August 2, 2010 sworn complaint and/or August 13, 2010 second not-guilty plea.
(R., pp.183, 219.) This caused a trial setting 17 days outside of the I.C. § 193501 6-month speedy trial period. (Id.)
The district court properly analyzed this delay. This type of delay, a data
entry error, is a "neutral" reason for delay in a constitutional speedy trial analysis,
i.e., unlike a bad-faith delay caused by the state, it should not be heavily weighed
against the state in determining whether the defendant's speedy trial rights were
violated. See Moore, 148 Idaho at 900, 231 P.3d 532 at 545 ("neutral reason[s],
such as negligence or overcrowded courts, should be weighed less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the state rather than with the defendant"); see also
Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, State v. Wavrick, 123 Idaho 83, 89, 844 P.2d 712, 718
(Ct. App. 1992); State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828,837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App.
2005.) In a statutory speedy trial analysis, such a "neutral reason," is at worst, a
"weaker reason" such that would require the state to show a relatively shorter
trial delay, less assertive or absent speedy trial right demand, and a lack of
prejudice from the trial delay in order for the reason for the delay to constitute
"good cause." See Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 803 P.2d at 936 (quoting Peterson,
288 N.W.2d at 335); Hernandez, 136 Idaho at 11, 27 P.3d at 420.
In this case, the district court considered the Barker factors, and properly
concluded that the trial delay did not violate Jacobson's speedy trial rights. (R.,
pp.182-189.) The district court correctly found that the approximately two and
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one-half week jury trial delay was "insignificant," and that Jacobson had not
(R., pp.187-189) Indeed, Jacobson

shown any prejudice from the brief

day he was arraigned, and there is no

was released on his own recognizance

indication in the record that he was ever subsequently jailed on the charges.
(See R., pp.16-17.) Jacobson has not asserted any other specific prejudice from
the short delay, such as significant anxiety or impairment of defense, either
below or on appeal, and no such specific prejudice is apparent from the record.
The state agrees with the district court's conclusion that Jacobson did not
waive his speedy trial rights by failing to object to the late jury trial setting during
the three months between when the trial date was set and when the six-month
period expired.

(R., pp.187-188).

However, in a Barker factor balancing test,

Jacobson's failure to object to the late trial setting, despite an opportunity to do
so, should cause his previous speedy trial right assertion to be weighed less
heavily against the state than if Jacobson had objected and had his request to
schedule the trial for an earlier date been denied.
In Barker, the United States Supreme Court found it "important" to the
constitutional speedy trial balancing test conducted in that case that "the record
strongly sugest[ed] that while [the defendant] hoped to take advantage of the
delay in which he had acquiesced, and thereby obtain a dismissal of the charges,
he definitely did not want to be tried."

Barker, 407 U.S. at 534-535; see also

Davis, 141 Idaho at 839, 118 P.3d at 171; Moore, 148 Idaho at 902-903, 231
P.3d at 547-548; Livas, 147 Idaho at 550, 211 P.3d at 795 (considering, in the
context of a statutory speedy trial

analysis, that "[a]fter Livas' initial not guilty
9

plea and demand for a jury trial, Livas did not object to the court's scheduling or
point out any possible problem with the pace of the case"). Similarly, the record
in this case suggests that Jacobson never requested a more expeditious trial
setting, was complicit in the trial delay, and possibly did not desire a speedy trial.
Jacobson's initial assertion of his speedy trial rights was thus weakened for
purposes of an I.C. § 19-3501 (4) analysis utilizing Barker factors.
In this case, the Barker factors do bear on and are relevant to the
sufficiency of the reason for the jury trial delay. The clerical error created only a
brief, non-prejudicial delay. Further, the nature of the data entry error, which was
apparently undetected by the court and state until Jacobson made his motion to
dismiss, permitted Jacobson to attempt to capitalize on the oversight by delaying
any reassertion of his speedy trial rights until after the six-month period expired.
Viewed outside a vacuum, the magistrate court's data entry error,
considered in conjunction with the short delay, lack of prejudice, and Jacobson's
delayed re-assertion of his speedy trial rights constituted "good cause" for the
trial delay.

The district court therefore did not err in reversing the magistrate

court's dismissal and reinstating the misdemeanor DUl, possession of a
controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia charges.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this

affirm the district court's

order reversing the magistrate's court's dismissal
DATED this 6th day of February 2012

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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Mark W. Olson ~
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